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Traditionally, landlords and tenants under leases of commercial
property have been able to determine their respective rights, duties
and liabilities, to each other and to third parties, by using the common
law of the jurisdiction in which the demised premises are located and
local statutes applicable to the subject matter of their lease contract.
Having thus determined those rights, duties and liabilities, the land-
lord and tenant could then, by contractual provision in their lease, al-
ter or vary those rights and duties and shift liabilities to the extent
allowed by the law governing the lease contract.
Consequently, when entering into a lease for commercial property,
prospective landlords and tenants generally were aware that, unless
otherwise provided in the written lease contract, the landlord would
have responsibility only for delivering possession of the premises and
for delivering to the tenant a leasehold interest that would not be dis-
turbed by persons with paramount title.'
Subject to statutory provisions, no implied warranty of habitabil-
ity or fitness for a particular purpose and no obligation on the part of
the landlord to make repairs or improvements to the premises covered
by the lease existed.2 Commercial tenants recognized that, in the ab-
sence of a contrary lease provision, they would bear all responsibility
for repair and maintenance of the property. They also realized that
unless otherwise provided in the lease, no abatement in rent would be
justified by claims of untenantable conditions or destruction of the
premises.
Each party recognized that if a nuisance or dangerous condition
existed or developed on the premises, liability to third parties for any
* Shareholder, McNair Law Firm, P.A., Columbia, S.C.
** Shareholder, McNair Law Firm, P.A., Columbia, S.C.
The authors wish to acknowledge and thank James W. Potter, an associate with
McNair Law Firm, P.A., for his technical advice in the preparation of this Article. The
authors also express their appreciation to R. Glenn Dixon, Christie N. Barrett and Kath-
erine E. Mims for their invaluable research assistance.
1. See 49 AM. JuR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 1, 280 (1977).
2. Id. § 774.
3. See id. §§ 309, 768.
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injuries caused by that nuisance or dangerous condition would fall
upon the landlord if the condition existed at the inception of the lease.
Otherwise, parties expected courts to impose liability upon both the
landlord and the tenant if the tenant was responsible for the develop-
ment of the condition and the landlord allowed the condition to exist.
4
Because the common law governing commercial leases generally
favors landlords, leaving tenants to bear most of the responsibilities
and liabilities, parties entering into such leases frequently negotiate
the terms of the lease to allocate responsibilities and liabilities in order
to vary contractually the obligations imposed by the common law.
Typical provisions in a commercial lease may provide for: (1) abate-
ment of rent in certain circumstances; (2) limitations on permissible
uses by the tenant; (3) division of responsibilities for maintenance and
repair; (4) assignment of responsibility for payment of taxes and main-
tenance of insurance coverage; (5) specific limited warranties of title
and condition and covenants of quiet enjoyment; and (6) allocation of
liability for certain damages to the property and to third parties, to-
gether with an agreement of the party assuming such liability to in-
demnify and hold the other harmless for any costs or expenses in-
curred by the nonindemnifying party in connection with the allocated
liability. In short, commercial leases have developed into documents
intended to be all-inclusive, leaving nothing to be determined by refer-
ence to general rules of the common law governing landlord and tenant
relationships. Because of the freedom which contracting parties ordina-
rily have to vary liabilities imposed by law, courts ordinarily have up-
held these lease provisions altering the rules of the common law, unless
presented with public policy reasons for refusing to enforce certain
provisions.5
As a result of the development of commercial leases as complete
statements of the rights, duties and liabilities of landlords and tenants,
the parties to such leases have, until recently, felt secure in the knowl-
edge of the extent of their rights and liabilities under any particular
lease. In recent years, however, the development of a body of federal
statutory law dealing with environmental hazards and the imposition
of liability for the existence of these hazards has imposed upon land-
4. Id. § 898; see United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
5. See generally 49 Am. JuR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 227 (1987) (no right of
landlord to enter and make repairs unless provided in lease); id. § 230 (lease provisions
limiting permitted uses of property); id. § 600 (provisions for abatement of rent); id. §
768 (express warranty of suitability or fitness); id. § 771 (express warranty as to defects);
id. § 774 (express covenants to make repairs); id. § 922 (provisions varying tenant's obli-
gations to maintain premises).
[Vol. 41
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LANDLORD AND TENANT LIABILITY
lords and tenants an additional group of liabilities that the parties can-
not always avoid by contractual provision.
The Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)5 gives the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) the power to recover its costs in cleaning up
a hazardous waste site from, among others, the "owners and operators"
of the facility." Under CERCLA (also commonly called the
"Superfund") as amended by the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),8 both the federal and state gov-
ernments have authority to respond to releases and threatened releases
of hazardous substances and thereby protect the public health and en-
vironment. The term "hazardous substance" is broadly defined under
CERCLA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and includes
toxic pollutants, hazardous air pollutants under the federal Clean Air
Act and any "imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture
.... ,,* CERCLA authorizes the EPA to target hazardous waste sites
for cleanup and either compel the responsible parties to conduct and
pay for the cleanup or perform the cleanup itself and seek reimburse-
6. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). In addition to CERCLA, Congress
enacted amendments in 1984 to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)), to regulate the operation, installation and removal of under-
ground storage tanks (UST) containing petroleum or hazardous substances. RCRA §§
9001-9010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i (Supp. V 1987). The federal government enacted
UST regulations which became effective December 22, 1988. See 40 C.F.R. § 280 (1989).
South Carolina also has adopted a program to regulate underground storage tanks. S.C.
CODE REGS. 61-92.1 to -92.15 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The state's regulations were adopted
prior to implementation of federal regulations and are now outdated as a result of the
1988 federal regulations.
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control currently is
seeking General Assembly approval, as required by the Administrative Procedures Act,
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-23-120 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1989), to modify South Carolina's
UST regulations to adopt the federal requirements so that South Carolina can be dele-
gated authority from the EPA to supervise the UST program.
The regulatory program for UST regulation focuses on the owner or operator of un-
derground tanks. The owner or operator of a UST can be held liable for failure to prop-
erly operate the tank or for failure to clean up a spill or a leak from an underground tank
or its associated piping. In the case of tanks no longer in use as of November 8, 1984, the
owner or operator of the tank immediately prior to the discontinuance of the tank's use
may be held liable for violations of the UST regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 280.12 (1989).
8. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1612 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
9. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. V 1987). Interestingly, petro-
leum releases are excluded from the definition of a "hazardous substance." See id.
1990]
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ment from any "potential responsible party" (PRP).10 Under CER-
CLA, past and present hazardous waste site owners and operators, haz-
ardous waste generators, and hazardous waste transporters are
considered PRPs potentially liable for costs incurred by the EPA as
the result of a release or threatened release of hazardous substances.
11
Courts interpreting CERCLA have concluded that the statute al-
lows for the imposition of joint and several liability among all PRPs.12
As a result, each PRP is potentially liable for the entire cost of clean-
ing up a site, even though some of the parties may be responsible for
more waste disposal or transportation than others. When SARA was
passed in 1986, it codified the judicially interpreted federal common
law right to contribution among PRPs. 5 Accordingly, if a court im-
poses joint and several liability for hazardous waste cleanup on several
PRPs, the EPA may elect to seek full recovery from one PRP, who in
turn may seek contribution from other PRPs. This authority may
prove to be especially useful to the EPA in the frequently encountered
situation in which one or more of the PRPs are insolvent, bankrupt or
otherwise unavailable for recovery of costs.
Furthermore, courts construing CERCLA have held that parties
identified as responsible persons in CERCLA section 107(a) are strictly
10. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (detailing powers of EPA under
CERCLA).
11. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). This section
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel ... or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dis-
posal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances...
(4) . . . shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan . ...
Id.
12, E.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F.
Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal.
1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
13, See SARA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
[Vol. 41
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss4/6
LANDLORD AND TENANT LIABILITY
liable for the release of a hazardous substance. 14 There are, however,
three limited affirmative defenses to liability provided in CERCLA sec-
tion 107(b):
1) an act of God;
2) an act of war;
3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connec-
tion with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant... if the defendant establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that: (a) he exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the charac-
teristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions .... 15
Accordingly, if there is a "contractual relationship" with the third
party who caused the release, section 107(b)(3) is not applicable and
liability follows.
Section 101(35) of CERCLA6 provides, inter alia, what is com-
monly known as the "innocent landowner defense." Pursuant to por-
tions of that section, the term "contractual relationship" includes land
contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession
unless the property was acquired after the disposal or placement of the
hazardous substance occurred and the defendant can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that "[a]t the time the defendant ac-
quired the facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to
know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release
or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility."' 7 To
establish that the defendant "had no reason to know" for the purposes
of section 101(35), the defendant "must have undertaken, at the time
of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice in an effort to minimize liability."' 8
While section 101(35)(B) clearly envisions that the courts will de-
termine the scope of the defense and the level of due diligence re-
quired, it does set forth the following five factors a court should take
14. E.g. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Colorado v.
Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Colo. 1989); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
15. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
16. CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (Supp. V 1987).
17. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (em-
phasis added).
18. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
1990]
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into consideration in determining whether the inquiry was appropriate:
[1] any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defend-
ant, [2] the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the prop-
erty if uncontaminated, [3] commonly known or reasonably ascertain-
able information about the property, [41 the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and [5]
the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection."
The precise level of due diligence necessary to invoke the innocent
landowner defense is difficult to ascertain.
As previously mentioned, any person who is the current owner or
operator of a hazardous waste site or facility is potentially liable under
CERCLA.20 Courts have construed this liability provision to mean that
the current owner or operator of a site or facility containing hazardous
waste may be held liable even though the pollution occurred during a
previous ownership. 21 Thus, a person who knowingly or unknowingly
purchases or operates a site on which hazardous substances are discov-
ered and is the owner or operator at the time of cleanup is potentially
liable to the EPA for the total cost of cleaning up the site.
Recent judicial decisions construing CERCLA have dealt with a
range of factual situations evidencing broad application of the statute
in imposing liability upon landlords and tenants as "owners and opera-
tors". In determining who is liable for cleanup or response costs under
CERCLA, the federal district courts and courts of appeal have looked
exclusively to section 107(a) of CERCLA.22 These courts often have
determined liability in response to a motion for summary judgment,
23
thus demonstrating their interpretation that liability under CERCLA
is strict liability,24 without regard to causation or fault.
25
19. Id.
20. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see also Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987) (discussing "covered persons" under 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)), af'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986) (discussing liability of waste
generators, operators, owners, and lessors), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom.
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3156 (1989); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (cur-
rent and former owners held jointly and severally liable).
21. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. at 1279-81.
22. The courts uniformly have rejected arguments against liability based upon con-
tractual provisions or equitable considerations. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., 858 F. 2d 160;
Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. 1269; Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361.
23. See, e.g., South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984; see also
cases cited supra note 14.
24. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160; New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Colo. 1989);
Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
[Vol. 41
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As discussed earlier, CERCLA section 107(a) imposes liability
upon both current owners and operators and past owners and opera-
tors of facilities on which a release of hazardous substances has taken
place.26 The provisions of this section are those under which the courts
have held landlords and tenants liable for cleanup costs.
Courts have interpreted "facility" to mean virtually anywhere a
hazardous substance is found.27 No requirement exists that the facility
be a waste treatment or storage facility.2 8 "CERCLA defines the term
'facility' broadly to include any property at which hazardous sub-
stances have come to be located."2 9
Owners or operators at the time cleanup costs are incurred have
been considered to be owners or operators for purposes of section
107(a)(1).10 Some current owners of property have argued that the
statute is not intended to impose liability upon an owner who did not
own the property at the time of the disposal of hazardous substances.
The courts uniformly have rejected that argument, however." In con-
trast, past owners and operators of the property are liable under CER-
CLA only if they were owners or operators of the facility at the time of
disposal of a hazardous substance.3 2 In any case, the only defenses to
the strict liability imposed by section 107(a) are the limited affirmative
defenses set forth in section 107(b).13
The United States relied on CERCLA section 107(a) in United
States v. Argent Corp.34 when it brought an action against the land-
lord-owner and the tenant of property on which the tenant disposed of
hazardous substances. The landlord moved for summary judgment, as-
serting that his mere ownership of the property, without any connec-
tion to the business of the tenant, did not constitute ownership for
purposes of CERCLA liability. The United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico rejected this argument, finding no require-
Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
25. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032; United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. 1269.
26. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
27. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (property currently used for condomin-
ium development is a facility under the Act due to presence of hazardous substances and
previous uses).
28. Id. at 1037-44.
29. Id. at 1043, n.15 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
30. FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987).
31. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1043-44.
32. Id. at 1044.
33. See Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
1988); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 745 (W.D. Mich.
1987), aff'd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989).
34. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984).
1990]
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ment of "participation in management or in operation as a prerequisite
to owner liability." 35
The court also rejected attempts by the landlord to rely on the
third-party defense set forth in CERCLA section 107(b)(3). 38 The
landlord argued that the release of hazardous substances was caused
solely by the act of a third party, in this case the tenant. The court
ruled that the landlord could not rely on the affirmative defense be-
cause the lease agreement created a contractual relationship between
the landlord and the tenant.-7 The court noted that the landlord "can-
not show, as required by § 107(b), that the release was caused solely by
a third party which [sic] did not share a contractual relationship with
him.' 38 Because he failed to meet the statutory requirements, as a mat-
ter of law the landlord could not rely on the third-party defense and
the court denied summary judgment.38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit fol-
lowed the same reasoning and rejected the third-party defense in New
York v. Shore Realty Corp.40 In that case, state of New York obtained
an order compelling the corporate owner and its stockholder-officer to
clean up a hazardous waste storage site. Neither the owner nor the
stockholder-officer generated the waste. The stockholder-officer, how-
ever, knew of its existence at the time the property was acquired. Te-
nants of the previous owner were operating an illegal hazardous waste
storage facility on the property and reports obtained by the stock-
holder-officer before the property transfer indicated that leaking had
occurred." 1
The state eventually supervised the removal of drums of hazard-
ous waste and sought recovery under CERCLA. The corporate owner
sought to avoid liability on the basis that it had not caused the damage
resulting from the hazardous substance.4 2 This argument was rebuked
by the court, which held that CERCLA section 107(a)(1) 43 "imposes
strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is a
release or threat of release, without regard to causation."' 4 The court
also rejected the owner's attempt to rely on the third party defense of
section 107(b), at least in part because the owner knew of the tenant's





40, 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 1038.
42. Id. at 1037-40.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
44. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044.
[Vol. 41
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activities on the property prior to taking title to the property and took
no precautions against the tenant's foreseeable actions in continuing to
dump hazardous waste at the site.'
The court in Shore Realty went even further and held the stock-
holder-officer liable for the state's response costs under CERCLA as an
operator of the facility under CERCLA section 107(a) because of the
stockholder-officer's role in managing the corporate owner.46
In United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal,
Inc.,47 the United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina treated the liability of a landlord as a foregone conclusion and
clarified that CERCLA liability extended to subtenants as well as to
tenants. In that case, the owners of a four-acre site in Columbia, South
Carolina verbally leased a portion of the site to a chemical company
(Original Tenant) for storage of chemicals and raw materials beginning
in 1972. In 1973 or 1974, several individuals connected with the Origi-
nal Tenant began storing hazardous wastes at the site as part of a
waste brokering and recycling operation. In 1976, the waste operation
was incorporated as South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc.
(SCRDI). SCRDI occupied part of the leased premises under a verbal
sublease until 1978, when it assumed the verbal lease with the
owners.
48
During the operations of SCRDI and its predecessors, approxi-
mately 7,200 fifty-five gallon drums of hazardous substances accumu-
lated on the site, randomly and haphazardly stacked, without regard to
their source or the nature of their contents. Drums were exposed to the
elements and many deteriorated to the point that their contents leaked
and oozed onto the ground and onto other drums. The exposure of the
substances to the elements and the commingling of the substances
caused fires, explosions and releases of noxious and toxic fumes.4'
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at-
tempted to remedy the hazardous conditions at the site. After reaching
agreements with a number of the generators and transporters associ-
ated with the site to perform seventy-five percent of the surface re-
moval work at the site, the EPA financed the remaining twenty-five
percent of the surface cleanup with funds from the Hazardous Sub-
stance Response Trust Fund (Superfund) established under CER-
45. Id. at 1049.
46. Id. at 1052. The stockholder-officer controlled the corporation and made all the
decisions. Id.
47. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986), affd in part, vacated in part sub nor. United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
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CLA.50 The United States then sued to recover the expended
Superfund monies from a number of defendants, including SCRDI (the
subtenant and polluter), four companies that had generated hazardous
substances and arranged with SCRDI for their treatment or disposal
(Generators), the Original Tenant under the verbal lease, and the own-
ers of the site (Landlords).51
The district court, in a series of orders beginning in 1984 and end-
ing in 1986,'52 found that SCRDI, the Generators, the Original Tenant
and the Landlords were jointly and severally liable for the response
costs incurred at the site.5 3 The court held that once the requisite
nexus under CERCLA section 107(a) is established between each de-
fendant and the facility where hazardous substances have been re-
leased, the defendants are strictly liable "unless [they] can prove that,
under the defenses enumerated in CERCLA Section 107(b)(1)-(4), the
release or threat of release of hazardous substances was caused solely
by unrelated persons or events. '5 4 The court granted summary judg-
ment to the United States with regard to liability of the Landlords.55
Summary judgment was based upon the fact that the Landlords were
the owners of the property at the time of disposal and that the affirma-
tive defense under CERCLA section 107(b)(3) was not available to the
Landlords "[b]ecause there is no question of the contractual link [the
verbal lease] between the landowners and SCRDI, whose liability is ad-
mitted . . .,.5
After a hearing on the merits, the court in South Carolina Re-
cycling held that the Original Tenant stood in the shoes of the owners
of the site and, therefore, was liable as an "owner" and an "operator"
of the property under CERCLA section 107(a).57 In reaching the con-
clusion that a tenant's control of the site mandates that tenants should
be considered "owners" for the purposes of CERCLA liability, the
court stated that "[t]o conclude otherwise would frustrate Congress'
intent that persons with responsibility for hazardous conditions bear
the cost of remedying those conditions."' 8
In considering the Original Tenant's liability as an owner, the
court stated that the Original Tenant's sublease of the property to
SCRDI strengthened the case for imposition of owner liability on the
50. Id. at 991.
51. Id. at 989-91.
52. See id. at 984.
53. Id. at 991.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 993.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1003.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 41
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Original Tenant, since "[a]s a general rule, a lessor or sublessor who
allows property under his control to be used by another in a manner
which endangers third parties or which creates a nuisance, is, along
with the lessee or sublessee, liable for the harm.
''59
Having determined the liability of all defendants,6 0 the court con-
cluded that, because it was impossible to ascertain the degree of rela-
tive contribution of each substance to the threatening condition at the
site, the harm was indivisible and the defendants were, therefore,
jointly and severally liable. 1 In so holding, the court stated that the
burden of proving divisibility of the harm, to avoid imposition of joint
liability, rests with defendants in CERCLA actions. Absent such proof,
liability shall be joint and several.6 2
Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit,6 3 the district court's judgment in South Carolina Recycling
was upheld with regard to the imposition of strict liability, 4 the liabil-
ity of the Landlords,6" the unavailability of a third-party defense for
the Landlords,6 6 and the imposition of joint and several liability.
6 7
In another case, the court held a past tenant liable for cleanup on
the basis of its role as the polluter. In United States v. Northernaire
Plating Company" the federal government brought an action to re-
cover the costs of removing hazardous substances located at a site
where Northernaire operated an electroplating business for ten years.
Northernaire was a tenant on this property and the government under-
took the cleanup action several years after termination of the
Northernaire's lease.69 The government sought recovery under CER-
59. Id.
60. SCRDI admitted liability as an operator and consented to the entry of summary
judgment against it. Id. at 993.
61. For the court's discussion as to SCRDI, the Generators, and the Landlords, see
id. at 994 (citing United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United
States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For the court's discussion as to
the Original Tenant, see id. at 1006.
62. Id. at 1006 (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1337-
38).
63. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3156 (1989).
64. "We agree with the overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted section
107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme." Id. at 167; see cases cited at id. n.11.
65. Id. at 168.
66. Id. at 168-69. In response to the Landlords' argument that they were ignorant of
the waste disposal activities because they never inspected the site before 1977, the
Fourth Circuit stated, "In our view, the statute does not sanction such willful or negli-
gent blindness on the part of absentee owners." Id. at 169.
67. Id. at 171-73.
68. 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
69. Id. at 744-45.
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CLA section 107(a) 70 from the owner of the property, the tenant
(Northernaire), and the individual who was the president and sole
shareholder of Northernaire while the electroplating business was oper-
ated at the site.
7 1
The United States District Court in Northernaire granted sum-
mary judgment against all defendants, finding them jointly and sever-
ally liable for the response costs incurred by the United States.7 2 In
determining that summary judgment was appropriate, the court stated
that the government must prove the following four things in order to
establish liability under CERCLA:
(1) that the ... site is a "facility" as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(9);
(2) that a "release" or "threatened release" of a "hazardous sub-
stance" from the ... site has occurred;
(3) that the release or threatened release has caused the United States
to incur "response costs"; and
(4) that each of the defendants is a "person" as that term is defined in
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(3).73
After establishing that the United States had met the require-
ments of proof with respect to the first three elements of the cause of
action, the court then addressed the issue of whether each defendant
was a "covered person" liable for response costs. As the owner and the
operator of the site, the owner and Northernaire were ruled to be per-
sons liable for the costs. 7 4 With regard to Northernaire's president and
shareholder, the court stated that "a corporate officer who has respon-
sibility for arranging for the disposal of hazardous waste is personally
liable under the provisions of CERCLA. ' '75 Citing Argent and South
Carolina Recycling as authority, the court stated that the third-party
defense under CERCLA section 107(b) was not available to either the
owner or Northernaire because of their contractual relationship created
by the lease.
7"
In its discussion of joint and several liability, the court in
Northernaire acknowledged that Northernaire and its president argua-
bly were responsible for causing the entire harm. Because the harm
was indivisible, however, and because "Congress clearly intended that
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
71. Northernaire, 670 F. Supp. at 743.
72. Id. at 749.
73. Id. at 746.
74. Id. at 747.
75. Id. (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1052 (2d Cir. 1985)).
76. Id. at 748.
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the landowner be considered to have 'caused' part of the harm,"'7 the
court held all three defendants jointly and severally liable.78 The court
noted that "'questions of determining "equitable shares of the liabil-
ity" with respect to an indivisible injury are appropriately resolved in
[an] action for contribution after plaintiff has been made whole.' ",71
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington made it clear in Washington v. Time Oil Co.80 that the
indirect contractual relationship between a landlord and a subtenant
was sufficient to support the imposition of CERCLA liability on both.
The state of Washington and the United States sought summary judg-
ment in that case on the basis that a landlord could not avoid liability
by relying on the innocent landowner defense for the actions of a sub-
lessee."' In denying the defense to the landlord, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington noted that the 1986
amendments to CERCLA added a supplement to the definition of the
term "contractual relationship" found in CERCLA Section 107(b).82
The amended definition provides in pertinent part:
The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of section
9607(b)(3) of this title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts,
deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession, unless the
real property on which the facility concerned is located was acquired
by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous
substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circum-
stances described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did
not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed
of on, in, or at the facility.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must es-
tablish that he has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a)
and (b) of this title.8 3
In evaluating the landlord's reliance on the defense as to the ac-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 749 (quoting United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984, 995 n.8 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156
(1989)).
80. 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
81. Id. at 529-30.
82. Id. at 530.
83. Id. at 530 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (Supp. V 1987)).
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tions of the subtenant, the court initially noted that the landlord had
at least an "indirect contractual relationship"8 with the subtenant.
Furthermore, the court stated that the landlord could not rely on the
innocent landowner defense because the landlord allowed the subten-
ant to "run a sloppy operation"85 and "did not exercise due care to
prevent the property from becoming contaminated by this sublessee." 8
While the question of fault is not relevant to the issue of liability,
a court may consider fault in determining the apportionment of dam-
ages in a suit for contribution. Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp.
8 7
involved a corporate owner of property which, through a separate cor-
porate division, had been the operator of a metal reclamation operation
on the site. That owner sold the assets of the metal reclamation divi-
sion to another corporation and, in connection with the sale of assets,
leased the site to the buyer-lessee. 8 Shortly after the inception of the
lease, the buyer-lessee discovered that the buildings and grounds of the
leased facility contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB)
contaminants."
After discovery of the contamination, the buyer-lessee notified the
owner-lessor of the presence of hazardous substances and vacated the
property so that the site could be cleaned up. The owner-lessor under-
took the cleanup and then brought an action against the buyer-lessee
for contribution for the necessary costs of response under CERCLA
section 107(a)(4)(B)9 0 In order to reach the question of contribution,
the district court first determined that the buyer-lessee, as a former
operator of the facility, and the owner-lessor, as the owner and opera-
tor of the facility, both were responsible persons under CERCLA and,
because the harm was indivisible, ruled that they were jointly and sev-
erally liable.91
In response to the buyer-lessee's attempts to put forth various eq-
uitable defenses to liability, the court reiterated that section 107(a) im-
poses strict liability subject only to the defenses set forth in section
84. Id. at 533.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
88. Id. at 1570-71.
89. Id. at 1571. The owner-lessor, and later the buyer-lessee, were engaged in the
processing of used capacitors and transformers to reclaim the copper cores and iron cas-
ings. Older capacitors and transformers contain significant amounts of PCBs, which spill
out when they are broken or crushed. Id.
90. Section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that a responsible party shall be liable for any
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
91. Versatile Metals, Inc., 693 F. Supp. at 1571.
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107(b).9 2 Thus, the court concluded that equitable defenses simply had
no place in a determination of liability. The court noted, however, that
"claims of relative fault and innocence relate, if at all, to the appor-
tionment of damages' ' sa in connection with an action seeking
contribution.
9 4
In another private action, a current owner of a site brought suit to
recover cleanup costs from the- former owner, the former owner's ten-
ant, and the principal shareholder of that tenant. Shortly after the
purchase of a facility, the purchaser in International Clinical Labora-
tories v. Stevens 5 was informed by state authorities that the site was
contaminated with hazardous substances, apparently as a result of the
activities of the former owner's tenant. During the testing and cleanup
of the property, the purchaser initiated suit against the defendants to
recover the costs associated with testing and cleanup.98 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York declined to
grant summary judgment in favor of the former owner, stating that the
former owner of the property was potentially liable under CERCLA
section 107(a) and that the lease between the former owner and the
former tenant constituted a contractual relationship which barred the
former owner's use of the third-party defense under CERCLA section
107(b)(3).2
The former owner in International Clinical Laboratories also at-
tempted to establish a defense against liability based upon an "as is"
clause in the contract of sale, but the court concluded that under New
York law the clause did not bar the CERCLA claim.98 The court also
rejected the former owner's argument of equitable estoppel against the
purchaser, which the former owner based uipon the purchaser's oppor-
tunity to investigate before the purchase. 9 Finally, the court rejected
the argument that the former owner should be free from liability be-
cause of a statement that the former owner had no knowledge of the
92. Id. at 1572.
93. Id.
94. Section 9613(f)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Any person may seek contribu-
tion from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of
this title .... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropri-
ate." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
95. 710 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
96. Id. at 469.
97. Id. at 470-71 (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d
Cir. 1985); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
98. Id. at 469-70.
99. Id. at 471.
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contamination caused by his tenant.00 The court concluded that "if
[the former owner's] claim of ignorance of violations of environmental
requirements is true, the equities weigh in favor of holding [him] liable
since he 'buried his head in the sand' and seeks to impose liability
upon an 'unwary purchaser.' " The court noted, however, that equi-
table principles might be considered if the court chose to do so when
determining whether to apportion responsibility for response costs.
10 2
Even though the cases establish that landlords and tenants may
not be able to escape joint and several liability for cleanup of a facility
when they are determined to be PRPs, landlords and tenants, between
themselves, can allocate the risks associated with environmental
liability.
10 3
As with sales contracts, lease agreements sometimes provide that
one party will accept the property from the other "as is." Although "as
is" clauses have been used to argue that the burden of CERCLA liabil-
ity shifts, the cases commonly have held that such clauses preclude
only claims for breach of warranty and are not sufficient to shift CER-
CLA liability from one party to another.1
04
A more effective manner of shifting the ultimate burden for CER-
CLA liability, as between private parties, may be to include in the
lease an indemnification provision that also expressly releases one
party from CERCLA liability. While the statute itself need not be ref-
erenced,10 5 the provision must express clearly an intent to release one
party from future CERCLA-type liabilities. 0 6 The following language
in a contract of sale has been held not to be sufficient:
Seller shall protect, defend[,] . . .indemnify and save and hold
harmless Buyer ... from and against any and all ... costs, expenses,
damages, losses, obligations, lawsuits, claims, liabilities, fines, or pen-
alties ... resulting from Seller's acts, alleged acts, omissions, and al-
leged omissions before the Closing Date ... arising out of, resulting
100. Id. at 468.71.
101. Id. at 471.
102. Id. In International Clinical Laboratories, the court declined to grant sum-
mary judgment to the purchaser against all of the defendants, stating that sufficient
facts were not before the court to determine the liability of each of the defendants. The
former tenant of the site alleged that its subleasee had caused the contamination on a
portion of the property, but because facts regarding these allegations were not before the
court, it declined to rule on the question of the tenant's liability as a sublessor. Id.
103. See Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988); 42
U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
104. See International Clinical Laboratories, 710 F. Supp. at 469-70; Southland
Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 1001.
105. FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D. Minn. 1987) (a
release from "all claims, demands and causes of action" was held to be sufficient).
106. Southland Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 1002.
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from, relating to, or incident to:
(4) the ownership, use, maintenance, or operation of the Assets or
the Great Meadows Business, and any action taken or omitted to be
taken in connection with or relating thereto, which occurred or arose
during, or relates to, any period prior to the Closing.
1 07
The redistribution of risk must be clear and unequivocal.0 8 The right
to indemnification, once established, can be utilized to pursue a private
cause of action against the other party when the indemnified party has
been found liable under CERCLA.10 9
Other lease provisions potentially beneficial in allocating the risk
of environmental damages are clauses specifying how the tenant may
use the property and identifying the party responsible for obtaining
environmental permits, complying with environmental laws and regula-
tions, and disclosing violations of environmental laws to the regulatory
agencies. Since the right of contribution between PRPs is based on the
equities involved, these lease provisions can help establish which party
undertook the responsibility for meeting the environmental concerns.
Arguably, that party should bear the majority of the cleanup costs.110
Shifting the burden for cleanup of hazardous substances by con-
tract yields no beneficial results if the party assuming the liability is
financially incapable of meeting its obligations. Consequently, at the
time the lease is entered into, it is imperative to determine the finan-
cial condition of the party undertaking the responsibility for environ-
mental compliance. This determination can be made by a review of
financial statements. If a tenant is leasing the property for a purpose
that involves the manufacture, storage or use of hazardous substances,
the landlord may want to require a parent company to execute a guar-
anty to cover lease obligations with regard to environmental cleanup
costs. Alternatively, the landlord might require a letter of credit upon
which the landlord could draw in the event that cleanup costs were
later incurred as a result of the tenant's activities on the property.
To determine whether the tenant caused any environmental im-
pact on the property, lease terms could require that pre-lease and post-
lease environmental audits of the property be conducted. For example,
the tenant could have an audit of the property conducted prior to com-
mencement of the lease term, with the level of the audit determined by
107. Id.
108. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
109. Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
110. Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d. 645 (8th Cir. 1985).
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the tenant. At the conclusion of the lease term, the landlord could de-
termine the level of the audit to be conducted and the tenant could be
responsible for restoring the property to the condition that existed at
the commencement of the lease.
An owner must exercise due care to prevent a tenant from contam-
inating the property."" One of the best protections for the landlord
against unwittingly becoming liable for acts of tenants is to know what
activity is being conducted on the property. A landlord cannot avoid
liability simply because it was unaware of the tenant's particular use of
the property. A "lessor or sublessor who allows property under his con-
trol to be used by another in a manner which endangers third parties
or which creates a nuisance, is, along with the lessee or sublessee, liable
for the harm.11 12 Through careful drafting and negotiation of lease
agreements, the risk of CERCLA liability to landlords and tenants can
be lessened or minimized.
111. Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 530 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
112. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
1003 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub noma. United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
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